I am senior vice president and senior advisor to the president at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

My research uses micro data to inform our understanding of the macroeconomy. I have studied issues including migration, risk sharing, labor markets, and inflation. My work has been published in the Journal of Political Economy, Quantitative Economics, Demography, and other journals.

[Bio] [CV]

Updates

October 2023: Emily Greenwald, Joshua Younger and I wrote a working paper on the risks associated with bank deposit funding: “Deposit Convexity, Monetary Policy, and Financial Stability”. Contrary to conventional assumptions that bank deposit rates move linearly with market rates, we find that the bank deposit “betas” rise as market rates rise. Bank deposits’ duration therefore falls as rates rise. This convexity amplifies monetary policy transmission and increases financial fragility.

October 2023: I gave the opening keynote speech at FIA Forum: Commodities 2023 in Houston: “Commodity derivatives markets and financial stability”.

September 2023: Laila Assanie, Amy Chapel, Lorenzo Garza, Emily Greenwald and I examined risks in commercial real estate: “New office buildings rise on Texas skyline despite difficult market” (Dallas Fed Economics).

October 2023: I gave a speech on the role of financial markets in the energy transition at a conference organized by the Dallas Fed and University of Houston: “Price discovery, risk transfer and energy finance”.

December 2022: Matthew McCormick and I assessed the benefits and costs of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s proposal to expand the central clearing of Treasury securities: “Expanded central clearing would increase Treasury market resilience” (Dallas Fed Economics). The SEC proposal would adopt changes in customer clearing that I described in my research on the customer settlement risk externality.

March 2022: My paper “The customer settlement risk externality at U.S. securities CCPs” is forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures. I show that investors do not always bear the full cost of settlement risk for their trades and can impose some of this cost on the brokerages where they are customers. When markets are volatile and settlement risk is high, this externality can result in too much or too little trading relative to the efficient level.